Who knew the 6.15 Omega Quests… (Spoilers)

[EaraGrace]

You're misusing the idea of positive utilitarianism here - to put it crudely, positive utilitarianism is the belief that the foremost moral imperative is to maximize happiness, while negative utilitarianism is the belief that the foremost moral imperative is to reduce suffering. As far as I know, there's no school of utilitarian thought that advocates preserving and spreading life for its own sake, rather than out of utility to those who are currently alive.

Yet for happiness to exist, beings must live on that are capable of being happy. Hell, the repugnant conclusion is the utilitarian argument for the Sundering all wrapped up in a bow is it not?



One can easily draw a comparison between the Unsundered in the A column and the Sundered shards in B.

[Lurina]

Yet for happiness to exist, beings must live on that are capable of being happy. Hell, the repugnant conclusion is the utilitarian argument for the Sundering all wrapped up in a bow is it not?



One can easily draw a comparison between the Unsundered in the A column and the Sundered shards in B.

I'm not sure why you're using the idea of the repugnant conclusion (assuming you're quoting Derek Parfit here) when total utilitarianism, the idea he's tearing down, is generally rejected by philosophers in favor of variations on average utilitarianism. Even Henry Sidgwick, who's known for raising the question in the first place and did agree with ideas like it being a net good to create more humans so long as it wasn't at the expense of average happiness, still had that qualifier; he wouldn't have approved of something that massively expanded the population at the expense of everyone who existed beforehand, let alone the mean quality of life. To quote his book, The Methods of Ethics:

Assuming, then, that the average happiness of human beings is a positive quantity, it seems clear that utilitarianism directs us to make the number of happy people as large as we can without lowering the average level of happiness. But if we foresee as possible that an increase in numbers will be accompanied by a decrease in average happiness, or vice versa, a point arises that hasn’t ever been explicitly discussed and seems to have been substantially overlooked by many utilitarians—·i.e. seems not to have had even a subliminal influence on their thinking·. Utilitarianism prescribes as the ultimate end of action, happiness on the whole, not any individual’s happiness except considered as a part of the whole.

It follows that if the additional population enjoy on the whole positive happiness, we ought to weigh the amount of happiness gained by the extra number against the amount lost by the remainder. So that the point up to which population ought to be encouraged to increase is not that at which average happiness is the greatest possible, as is often assumed by political economists of the school of Malthus, but that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons living by the amount of average happiness reaches its maximum.

The founding principle of utilitarianism as outlined by Jeremy Bentham is the greatest-happiness principle, which is the assertion that all ethics must be grounded in the imperative to create the most happiness and the least suffering for all sentient beings. Abundance of sentient life, either laterally or vertically (through time) is not valuable unless it serves that pursuit. Happiness is not a master to be served, but an emergent goal that comes with the existence of each new person, and the priority must always be on those who are extant as happy and free from suffering as possible. William Shaw puts it concisely: "Utilitarianism values the happiness of people, not the production of units of happiness".

It's not really compatible with Endwalker's value system.

[EaraGrace]

I'm not sure why you're using the idea of the repugnant conclusion (assuming you're quoting Derek Parfit here) when total utilitarianism, the idea he's tearing down, is generally rejected by philosophers in favor of variations on average utilitarianism.

I mostly meant it as a response to total utilitarianism and how one could justify the Sundering through that lens. For average you’d be right, but I think that comes with its own issues. One for example couldn’t justify fighting against the Rejoinings if that is indeed what we’re following, which might be a feature rather than bug to some.

The founding principle of utilitarianism as outlined by Jeremy Bentham is the greatest-happiness principle, which is the assertion that all ethics must be grounded in the imperative to create the most happiness and the least suffering for all sentient beings. Abundance of sentient life, either laterally or vertically (through time) is not valuable unless it serves that pursuit. Happiness is not a master to be served, but an emergent goal that comes with the existence of each new person, and the priority must always be on those who are extant as happy and free from suffering as possible. William Shaw puts it concisely: "Utilitarianism values the happiness of people, not the production of units of happiness".

It's not really compatible with Endwalker's value system.

Benthams flavor of hedonistic utilitarianism is probably the furthest you can get from Endwalkers, and 14 in general, moral view I can agree.

There was a reference incidentally that some of the creations in Elpis were specifically designed to be security guards for restricted or sensitive facilities (specifically, the minotaurs), which begs the question: why do they even need security guards in a supposedly 'perfect' world where hardship like war doesn't appear to exist?

I’d honestly love to know what exactly the Amaroutine security apparatus looks like. On one hand it’s suggested they don’t need guards, the need for creations to both guard Elpis and to counter the spreading Final Days, and on the other you have the seat of Pashtarot and it’s job to maintain order. Gets the noggin joggin.

[Lurina]

Its also still open if these other regions also had Ancients like the ones in Amaurotines living there or if maybe other races already existed.

IIRC, it's a minor plot point in Endwalker that the Ancients weren't aware that the Final Days could cause a transformation instead of a forced summoning in beings with low dynamis, which suggests that everyone experiencing the Final Days back then could also use creation magic. Maybe? I dunno, it often doesn't feel like the FFXIV writers fully think these things through.

I mostly meant it as a response to total utilitarianism and how one could justify the Sundering through that lens. For average you’d be right, but I think that comes with its own issues. One for example couldn’t justify fighting against the Rejoinings if that is indeed what we’re following, which might be a feature rather than bug to some.

You could certainly argue against the Rejoinings on a utilitarian basis insofar as they cause tremendous present-day suffering in pursuit of hypothetical future happiness. If it was as simple as snapping your fingers and reaffixing everyone's souls to original counterpart, not so much, but.

Benthams flavor of hedonistic utilitarianism is probably the furthest you can get from Endwalkers, and 14 in general, moral view I can agree.

I think it's pretty obvious that FFXIV has a bone to pick with hedonism in general, but what's frustrating about it to me isn't that it has this opinion - there's nothing wrong with a piece of art expressing a moral philosophy I don't agree with - but rather that it treats it as something self-evidently bad rather than really engaging with the question seriously. It deontologically regards the abundance of life as the utmost good for its own sake, but only really makes emotional arguments in justifying this premise, like Venat's "lands that stretched on forever" speech. And it caricatures its ethical opposition rather than actually countering their points substantially; for the Plenty civilization, which pursued optimal happiness over all else, the author simply invents a fantastical basis for why this is bad which ends up making them all kill themselves... Or in the other direction, Meteion, the closest thing to an anti-natalist counterargument to the perspective, is framed as a depressed victim who doesn't even really mean the ideology she espouses. (That's not to say I dislike Meteion as a villain; I was actually reasonably fond of her, but she obviously isn't intended as represent any kind of substantial antithesis.)

But despite that lack of substance, anything other than deference to its perspective is presented as a kind of immaturity. Despite the fact that the Ancients clamoring for their civilization to be restored at the potential long-term expense of future life emerging in the universe being pretty reasonable from a lot of moral perspectives, this is conceptualized as a kind of original sin; self-evidently bad.

This is one of the ways Endwalker frustrated me the most. I felt like I was being talked down to because it prosthelytized rather than argued.

[EaraGrace]

You could certainly argue against the Rejoinings on a utilitarian basis insofar as they cause tremendous present-day suffering in pursuit of hypothetical future happiness. If it was as simple as snapping your fingers and reaffixing everyone's souls to original counterpart, not so much, but.

That seems pretty unconvincing, given the hypothetical happiness actual existed. Besides, any suggested change to the status quo that causes short term hardship for long term gain would be that same deal.

I think it's pretty obvious that FFXIV has a bone to pick with hedonism in general, but what's frustrating about it to me isn't that it has this opinion - there's nothing wrong with a piece of art expressing a moral philosophy I don't agree with - but rather that it treats it as something self-evidently bad rather than really engaging with the question seriously. It deontologically regards the abundance of life as the utmost good for its own sake, but only really makes emotional arguments in justifying this premise, like Venat's "lands that stretched on forever" speech. And it caricatures its ethical opposition rather than actually countering their points substantially; for the Plenty civilization, which pursued optimal happiness over all else, the author simply invents a fantastical basis for why this is bad which ends up making them all kill themselves...

I actually don’t think hedonism is the games ethical antithesis. Negative utilitarianism/Anti-Natalism fits that role to me. Hedonism is proffered as an alternative, but ultimately fails due to the universal constants the game establishes, and I would argue the game says is true for our world as well. It’s sort of like how Nier is existentialism, and uses theism as a possible alternative, which is then shown to be false. I’m sure people who found religion to be their answer felt similarly playing through Nier, that their beliefs were caricatured or misrepresented.

Or in the other direction, Meteion, the closest thing to an anti-natalist counterargument to the perspective, is framed as a depressed victim who doesn't even really mean the ideology she espouses. (That's not to say I dislike Meteion as a villain; I was actually reasonably fond of her, but she obviously isn't intended as represent any kind of substantial antithesis.)

I think Meteion is not the source of despair, but the vehicle for the despair felt by the other civilizations. She’s not really meant to be the true representation of antinatalism, but the mechanism by which the story may prove it false. The scene at the end where we offer our answer was just that, us offering a new answer to countering the ones the Dead Ends offers. In this way, the game allows for Meteion to have doubts, but the Endsinger is as certain as ever.

[Lurina]

That seems pretty unconvincing, given the hypothetical happiness actual existed. Besides, any suggested change to the status quo that causes short term hardship for long term gain would be that same deal.

Most forms of utilitarian ethics are act or rule-oriented to a degree to offset this kind of reasoning - rather than always moving directly to maximize mean happiness in the long term, one must either prioritize the immediate consequences in the former case, or follow a set of rules designed around utilitarian ends in the latter. The Rejoinings were also not a sure-fire way to restore the Unsundered World, as the Ascians obviously had no idea how to fix the Void, and could be (and were) killed on the way to their goal, rendering the suffering they caused in its pursuit pointless. To paraphrase Sidgwick again, a risk is only ethical when the chance of benefit outweighs the cost and chance of loss.

I actually don’t think hedonism is the games ethical antithesis. Negative utilitarianism/Anti-Natalism fits that role to me. Hedonism is proffered as an alternative, but ultimately fails due to the universal constants the game establishes, and I would argue the game says is true for our world as well. It’s sort of like how Nier is existentialism, and uses theism as a possible alternative, which is then shown to be false. I’m sure people who found religion to be their answer felt similarly playing through Nier, that their beliefs were caricatured or misrepresented.

While I think it would be perfectly reasonable to dislike Nier Automata (I'm assuming we're talking about Automata here) for not representing religion - or really any belief system - in total good faith, I think this is taking things out of context a bit. The plot of Automata basically consists of presenting a series of answers to existentialism, pointing out their weakness in a fairly superficial way, and finally coming to the conclusion that there is no fundamental answer and that meaning is something personal that emerges through the act of living itself. It doesn't really try to preach an ideology itself much, it just tears a bunch of other stuff down; theism only gets about 20 minutes of direct attention.

However, the criticism it levies at religion, though shallow, is grounded in observable reality. If you base your life about the existence of a benevolent higher power that loves its believers, only for senseless bad things to happen to them, then the only obvious conclusion that doesn't compromise the whole ideology ("that bad thing must have been good for some reason! his grace has become a god!") can very quickly become antithetical to ones own well being. Of course, in reality, religions have developed very complex answers to these contradictions, but it works as a superficial rebuttal.

In contrast, there's not much of a rational basis for the idea that trying to eliminate suffering and maximize pleasure will eventually lead to an outcome like the Plenty. It's author fiat; a moral propped up only by the invented "universal constants" of the fiction.

I agree with the stuff you said about Meteion not really being a representation of anti-natalism herself, but I didn't feel the story really countered that perspective meaningfully either, instead just presupposing living as good and chanting "forge ahead". But my feelings about that aren't as strong since I'm not an anti-natalist, so it's probably not worth arguing about unless you specifically want to know my hot take.

[EaraGrace]

Most forms of utilitarian ethics are act or rule-oriented to a degree to offset this kind of reasoning - rather than always moving directly to maximize mean happiness in the long term, one must either prioritize the immediate consequences in the former case, or follow a set of rules designed around utilitarian ends in the latter.

Rule and Act utilitarians don’t simply look at the immediate consequences from my understanding, they can make distinctions between consequences that could be expected and ones that can’t, but ultimately it comes down to utility which isn’t time specific.

The Rejoinings were also not a sure-fire way to restore the Unsundered World, as the Ascians obviously had no idea how to fix the Void, and could be (and were) killed on the way to their goal, rendering the suffering they caused in its pursuit pointless. To paraphrase Sidgwick again, a risk is only ethical when the chance of benefit outweighs the cost and chance of loss.

The Unsundered obviously felt it worth the risk, as did apparently some Sundered as well, and found success. Zodiark was nearly freed, and seven shards had been rejoined. On whether that is still enough to justify the risk, we’d be getting into trying to quantify the happiness and suffering on Etheirys vs Hydaelyn.

While I think it would be perfectly reasonable to dislike Nier Automata (I'm assuming we're talking about Automata here) for not representing religion - or really any belief system - in total good faith, I think this is taking things out of context a bit. The plot of Automata basically consists of presenting a series of answers to existentialism, pointing out their weakness in a fairly superficial way, and finally coming to the conclusion that there is no fundamental answer and that meaning is something personal that emerges through the act of living itself. It doesn't really try to preach an ideology itself much, it just tears a bunch of other stuff down; theism only gets about 20 minutes of direct attention.

But it’s tearing down of other belief systems was in service to its overall message. The game doesn’t just say nothing, it actively pushes an existentialist message regarding meaning and purpose. The Ending E is pretty preachy though I love it for that. And then there’s Weight of the World.

However, the criticism it levies at religion, though shallow, is grounded in observable reality. If you base your life about the existence of a benevolent higher power that loves its believers, only for senseless bad things to happen to them, then the only obvious conclusion that doesn't compromise the whole ideology ("that bad thing must have been good for some reason! his grace has become a god!") can very quickly become antithetical to ones own well being. Of course, in reality, religions have developed very complex answers to these contradictions, but it works as a superficial rebuttal.

I’m not sure about that. One could easily say that Endwalker also works as a superficial rebuttal, not needing to go quite as deep as some believe it needed and failed to do. And given the real life rise in antinatalism, loss of global hope and optimism, and the increasing recognition of deaths by despair, I feel also connects to reality.

In contrast, there's not much of a rational basis for the idea that trying to eliminate suffering and maximize pleasure will eventually lead to an outcome like the Plenty. It's author fiat; a moral propped up only by the invented "universal constants" of the fiction.

Heavily disagree. Nozick discussed the experience machine and the Matrix directly talks about this in its own world building. The idea isn’t novel to Endwalker.